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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare 
(“Pennsylvania”) challenges a decision disallowing federal 
reimbursement of occupancy costs incurred in operating 
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community residential facilities for the developmentally 
disabled.  The District Court, on cross-motions for summary 
judgment, affirmed the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services‟ (“HHS”) determination that reimbursement of 
occupancy expenses is precluded by the statutory exclusion of 
room and board set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1).  
Discerning no error in the District Court‟s well-reasoned 
decision, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Pennsylvania, like every other state, participates in the 
Medicaid Program, which was established in 1965 under Title 
XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.  
Medicaid is “a cooperative, jointly funded, federal-state 
program to financially assist low income persons in securing 
medical care.”  Klein v. Califano, 586 F.2d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 
1978).  Under Medicaid, the federal government reimburses 
between 50% and 83% of state costs for patient care on behalf 
of eligible low-income individuals.  Medicaid is administered 
by HHS through its Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”). 
As part of Medicaid, states are eligible to receive 
federal financial participation to assist with medical 
assistance expenditures for eligible individuals in hospitals, 
nursing facilities, and intermediate care facilities for the 
mentally retarded.  Federal financial participation was 
extended in 1981 to cover developmentally disabled 
individuals receiving care in home- and community-based 
settings.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c).  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1396n(c)(1), states can opt-in to this coverage program by 
obtaining a “waiver” of other provisions of the Medicaid 
Statute.  Section 1396n(c)(1), in pertinent part, provides: 
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The Secretary may by waiver provide that a 
State plan approved under this subchapter may 
include as “medical assistance” under such plan 
payment for part or all of the cost of home or 
community-based services (other than room 
and board) approved by the Secretary which are 
provided pursuant to a written plan of care to 
individuals with respect to whom there has been 
a determination that but for the provision of 
such services the individuals would require the 
level of care provided in a hospital or a nursing 
facility or intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded the cost of which could be 
reimbursed under the State plan.  
42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
HHS has issued regulations implementing the 
exclusion of expenditures of federal funds for “room and 
board.” 1  See 42 C.F.R. § 441.310(a)(2).  The State Medicaid 
Manual, which serves as the official HHS interpretation of the 
law and regulations, contains the following explanatory 
statement: 
Except for respite care furnished in a State 
approved facility that is not [a] private 
residence (see item 4), [federal financial 
participation] is not available for room and 
board of the recipient as part of a home and 
community-based service.  Board means three 
                                              
1
There are exceptions to this rule with regard to 
personal caregivers and respite costs that are not relevant 
here.   
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meals a day or any other full nutritional 
regimen.  Room means hotel or shelter type 
expenses including all property related costs 
such as rental or purchase of real estate and 
furnishings, maintenance, utilities, and related 
administrative services. 
(A. 112a.) 
Pennsylvania obtained a home and community based 
service (“HCBS”) waiver in 2001.  The waiver, which was 
renewed in 2006, authorized reimbursement of state expenses 
for “habilitation services” for developmentally disabled 
individuals in home- and community-based treatment 
settings.
 2
 
Habilitation services are defined by statute as “services 
designed to assist individuals in acquiring, retaining, and 
improving the self-help, socialization, and adaptive skills 
necessary to reside successfully in home and community 
based settings.”  42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(5)(A).  The waiver 
granted to Pennsylvania defined these community habilitation 
services as follows: 
                                              
2
Pennsylvania provides habilitation services to 
developmentally disabled individuals in four living 
arrangements:  intermediate care facilities for the mentally 
retarded (“ICF/MRs”), community homes (also called 
“community residential facilities”), family living homes, and 
supported independent living arrangements.  Of these, 
funding to the nearly 2,200 non-profit or county-owned 
community residential facilities across the state is at issue 
here. 
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Community Habilitation means services 
designed to assist individuals in acquiring, 
retaining, and improving the self-help, 
socialization, and adaptive skills necessary to 
reside successfully in home and community-
based settings.  Habilitation may be provided up 
to 24 hours a day based on the needs of the 
individual receiving services.  Included are 
provider training costs, supervisory costs, 
purchased personnel costs, and costs of 
necessary supplies, equipment and adaptive 
appliances.  Services may be provided by a 
qualified family member or relative, 
independent contractor, or services agency. 
(A. 62a.) 
Pennsylvania provides habilitation services in nearly 
2,200 non-profit or county-owned community residential 
facilities.  From 2001 through part of 2006, Pennsylvania did 
not seek federal reimbursement for occupancy costs for 
Medicaid recipients living in such facilities.  Instead, 
Pennsylvania paid for residents‟ room and board in these 
facilities using a combination of state funds and the residents‟ 
Supplemental Security Income. 
On March 1, 2006, Pennsylvania began claiming a 
portion of occupancy costs as reimbursable “habilitation 
services.”3  Specifically, Pennsylvania claimed that 54.1667% 
                                              
3
 Beginning in late 2005, Pennsylvania employed the 
consulting firm MAXIMUS to maximize the Medicaid 
funding it was receiving from the federal government.  The 
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of its occupancy costs, including rent, utilities, interest, 
depreciation, building insurance, housekeeping, building 
repairs, maintenance and renovation, and furnishings and 
equipment were not, in fact, “room” costs, but were 
“habilitation costs.”  This claim was based on the fact that 
residents were engaged in “waiver services” on the premises 
for 13 hours in a typical 24-hour day, and, consequently, 
room costs for this period actually supported habilitation. 
CMS denied the request for inclusion of occupancy 
costs by a letter dated July 5, 2006, determining that the costs 
constituted “room and board” expenses and were therefore 
non-reimbursable under the statute and the State Medicaid 
Manual.  The letter expressly disapproved Pennsylvania‟s 
approach, noting that “[Section 4442.3.B.8 of the State 
Medicaid Manual] requires the clear differentiation between 
the services covered by the HCBS waiver that are provided in 
the residence and the cost of room and board, which by law 
cannot be covered.”  (A. 80a.)  CMS issued a letter dated 
August 17, 2006, stating that the State could not include the 
$50,939,457 in occupancy costs in its HCBS Medicaid 
claims.  An additional $9,997,220 was subsequently 
disallowed.  On June 21, 2007, CMS formally disallowed all 
of Pennsylvania‟s claims for occupancy costs. 
Pennsylvania appealed the disallowance to the HHS 
Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”), which upheld the 
disallowance on February 6, 2008.   The DAB explained:   
[T]he costs that Pennsylvania is calling 
“occupancy” (or “facility”) costs today are the 
                                                                                                     
claim for occupancy costs appears to have been developed 
from MAXIMUS‟ analysis and advice. 
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same as the costs that Pennsylvania previously 
has treated as room costs.  They have the same 
component parts: rent, utilities, interest, 
depreciation, building insurance, housekeeping, 
building repairs and maintenance, building 
renovations, furnishings and equipment, and 
repairs of furnishings and equipment.  For all 
intents and purposes, Pennsylvania‟s occupancy 
costs in community residential facilities are 
room costs; they are the costs of providing 
housing to the Medicaid recipients who live 
there. 
(A. 37a-38a.)   
Pennsylvania next brought suit in the U.S. District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging that 
the DAB‟s decision violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act as an action that was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion, or otherwise unlawful.  The District Court 
awarded summary judgment to HHS on March 31, 2010.  The 
court initially concluded that “[room and board] 
unambiguously means the provision of living space and 
meals.”  (A. 14a.)  The court further found that, even if the 
term “room” was ambiguous, under the deferential Chevron 
standard of review, the DAB‟s construction of the statutory 
term “room and board” was reasonable, supported by the 
language of the State Medicaid Manual, and entitled to 
deference. 
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II. 
 In this appeal from the decision of an administrative 
board,
4
 “we apply de novo review to the district court's ruling, 
and in turn apply the applicable standard of review to the 
underlying agency decision.”  Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc., 
v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 195-96 (3d Cir. 2010).  Under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, we must determine 
whether the Board‟s action was “arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”  
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).   
 Our review of whether an administrative board 
committed an abuse of discretion is governed by Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984).  Under Chevron, we follow a two-step 
analysis.  First, we determine “whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”  Id. at 842.  If it has, 
we must effectuate the intent of Congress.  If not, we must 
determine whether the agency‟s construction of the statute is 
“permissible.”  Id. at 843.  Notably, we “need not conclude 
that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly 
could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the 
reading the court would have reached if the question initially 
had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”  Id. at 843 n.11.   
 Our first inquiry is whether Congress has directly 
spoken to the issue of whether the “room and board” 
exclusion encompasses the “occupancy costs” which 
Pennsylvania seeks to claim.  “We determine whether 
Congress has unambiguously expressed [its] intent by looking 
                                              
4
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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at the plain and literal language of the statute.”  United States 
v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted).  “When determining a 
statute's plain meaning, our starting point is the ordinary 
meaning of the words used.  We refer to standard reference 
works such as legal and general dictionaries in order to 
ascertain the ordinary meaning of words.”  Id. (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 Webster‟s defines “room and board” as “lodging and 
food usu[ally] specifically earned or furnished.”  Webster‟s 
Third New International Dictionary 1972 (1993).  The 
applicable definition of “room” is given as “lodging 
consisting of a room usu[ally] specifically earned or 
furnished,” id. at 1972, and the applicable definition of 
“board” is given as “food in the form of daily meals often 
provided as payment for services,” id. at 243.  The Oxford 
English Dictionary, which dates the term back at least to the 
year 1795, defines “room and board” as “accommodation and 
meals,” and compares it to the phrase “bed and board,” 
meaning “entertainment with lodging and food,” which has 
been in existence since at least circa 1403.  See Room, n. and 
Bed, n., Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989), online 
version available at http://www.oed.com/.
5
 
 The plain meaning of “room and board,” therefore, 
encompasses not mere “living space,” but “lodging” that has 
been especially furnished together with food.  Lodging is 
defined as “a place to live” and “a room or rooms in the house 
of another used as a place of residence.”  Webster‟s Third 
                                              
5
 Black‟s Law Dictionary does not define the term. 
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New International Dictionary 1329 (1993).  The original 
phrase, “bed and board,” encompassed the furnishing of 
entertainment as part of one‟s lodging.  Indeed, as HHS 
points out, “the rent paid by the lodger at the boarding house 
of yesteryear entitled him to his seat at the dinner table and a 
chair in the parlor after dinner, not just the room where he 
slept.” (Appellee‟s Br. at 26.) The plain meaning of the term 
has never been limited to the actual hours occupied by 
sleeping and eating, but extends to the activities or 
entertainments incidental to the provision of lodging.
6
 
Because the plain meaning of the statute leaves no 
doubt that the costs at issue here were meant to be excluded 
from reimbursement, we find that the District Court did not 
err. 
Even if the definition of “room and board” were 
deemed ambiguous, however, we would still find that the 
DAB did not abuse its discretion.  Under the second prong of 
Chevron, if the agency‟s construction of the term “room and 
board” is permissible, we must allow it to stand.  A 
“„reasonable interpretation‟” of the statute is permissible.  
Pareja v. Attorney General, 615 F.3d 180, 193 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).  Indeed, in this Circuit, 
                                              
6
 Even Pennsylvania‟s own Administrative Code 
defines “room” as “[t]he client‟s share of lodging costs, utility 
costs – for example, electricity, heating, water and sewage – 
and annual upkeep costs of the community residential mental 
retardation facility – for example, trash collection, general 
maintenance including necessary repairs and renovation 
costs.”  55 Pa. Code § 6200.3.  It defines “board” as “[t]he 
client‟s share of his food and food preparation costs.”  Id.   
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statutory construction has been deemed permissible when it 
“is based on an accepted dictionary definition of the term . . . 
and does not impermissibly strain the plain language of the 
regulation.”  Secretary of Labor v. Beverly Healthcare-
Hillview, 541 F.3d 193, 200 (3d Cir. 2008). 
Here, the DAB construed the word “room” to include 
what Pennsylvania called “occupancy costs” because “[t]hey 
have the same component parts: rent, utilities, interest, 
depreciation, building insurance, housekeeping, building 
repairs and maintenance, building renovations, furnishings 
and equipment, and repairs of furnishings and equipment.”  
(A. 37a.)  The DAB added that these costs “are the costs of 
providing housing to the Medicaid recipients who live there.”  
(Id. at 38a.)  The DAB further distinguished “room” costs 
from reimbursable “habilitation services” costs, such as 
“provider training costs, supervisory costs, purchased 
personnel costs, and costs of necessary supplies.”  (Id.) 
The interpretation given to the phrase “room and 
board” is plainly reasonable.  It is consistent with the 
dictionary definitions mentioned above.  It is also consistent 
with the congressional determination to limit reimbursement 
to habilitation “services” exclusive of room and board.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err in according 
deference to the HHS interpretation.
7
 
                                              
7
 Pennsylvania argues that the State Medicaid Manual 
authorizes it to “allocate” its room costs between 
reimbursable and non-reimbursable expenses.  According to 
Pennsylvania, the State Medicaid Manual, which contains 
“[i]nstructions [which] are official interpretations of the law 
and regulations, and, as such, are binding on Medicaid State 
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Pennsylvania argues, however, that it is inappropriate 
to analyze this matter under the second step of Chevron 
because this issue concerns a federal grant to the states, which 
essentially involves a contract between Congress and the 
states.  Pennsylvania argues that “[t]he legitimacy of 
Congress‟ power to legislate under the Spending Clause rests 
upon whether States voluntarily and knowingly accept the 
terms of the contract,” that “[s]tates cannot accept terms of 
which they are unaware or unable to ascertain,” and that 
“obligations under Federal grants generally should be judged 
by reference to the law in effect when the grants were made.”  
(Appellant‟s Br. at 15-16 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).)  Accordingly, Pennsylvania claims that 
                                                                                                     
agencies,” State Medicaid Manual, Foreword, quoted in Sai 
Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 253 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009), 
states that “[t]here must also be a detailed cost allocation 
strategy provided as part of the waiver request to explain how 
the cost of waiver services in the residential setting will be 
determined and segregated from ineligible waiver costs.”  
State Medicaid Manual § 4442.3(B)(8) (reproduced in A. 
111a-12a).  Pennsylvania concludes that it is permitted to 
allocate “occupancy costs” between the permitted objective of 
habilitation services and the unpermitted objective of room 
and board, and this triggers the application of Office of 
Management and Budget Circular No. A-87 (“OMB A-87”), 
which governs the allocation process.  OMB-87, however, 
speaks only to “allowable costs.”  See Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget, Executive Office of the President, OMB Cir. No. A-
87, Revised (2004).  Because room costs are, by statute, not 
allowable, OMB-87 does not apply here.  The State Medicaid 
Manual does not generally enable ineligible costs to be 
bifurcated, as Pennsylvania now proposes. 
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because the definition of “room” did not definitely exclude 
what it now calls “occupancy costs,” to so find now would 
force Pennsylvania to accept a term which was not 
ascertainable at the time of agreement.  To support its 
argument, Pennsylvania cites Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 
632 (1985), and Bennett v. Kentucky Department of 
Education, 470 U.S. 656 (1985).   
These cases are inapposite.  Bennett v. New Jersey 
dealt with whether states were obligated to repay grants 
issued under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act.  In that case, New Jersey was the recipient of 
Title I grant monies which it distributed to numerous school 
districts.  New Jersey argued that substantive statutory 
changes made by Congress should retroactively govern the 
court‟s determination of whether New Jersey‟s distribution 
was in violation of Title I.  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
finding that “changes in substantive requirements for federal 
grants should not be presumed to operate retroactively.  
Moreover, practical considerations related to the 
administration of federal grant programs imply that 
obligations generally should be determined by reference to 
the law in effect when the grants were made.”  New Jersey, 
470 U.S. at 638.   
Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education, a 
companion case to Bennett v. New Jersey, also addressed a 
potential misuse of Title I funds.  The Court determined that 
Kentucky had used Title I funds to supplant, rather than 
supplement, existing educational funding.  Kentucky, 470 
U.S. at 660-61.  The Court expressed concern about a 
requirement that the funds be repaid, however, noting that “a 
demand for repayment is more in the nature of an effort to 
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collect upon a debt than a penal sanction.”  Id. at 662-63.  
While the Court agreed that “Congress must express clearly 
its intent to impose conditions on the grant of federal funds so 
that the States can knowingly decide whether or not to accept 
those funds,”  id. at 665-66 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), it found that “[t]here was no ambiguity with respect 
to [the] condition” imposed, id. at 666.  The Court further 
observed that “[u]nlike normal contractual undertakings, 
federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by 
statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress 
concerning desirable public policy.”  Id. at 669. 
Here, we do not deal at all with the retroactivity of 
statutory amendments or the issue of retroactive punitive 
sanctions.  On the contrary, the case before us involves a 
consistent interpretation of a statutory provision that has been 
applied throughout Pennsylvania‟s participation in the waiver 
program.  Indeed, prior to March 1, 2006, Pennsylvania‟s 
reimbursement applications excluded the very occupancy 
costs to which it now claims entitlement.  Thus, this case is 
unlike Bennett v. New Jersey, in which the Court recognized 
the concern that arises when a party had “a right that had 
matured or become unconditional.”  470 U.S. at 639 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Moreover, the interpretation of the 
room and board exclusion is by no means as uncertain as that 
of the provisions of Title I at issue in the Bennett decisions, 
which were the focus of considerable debate before Title I 
was updated and clarified.  See Bennett v. Ky. Dep’t of Educ., 
470 U.S. at 667-69 (reviewing history of Title I from its 1965 
enactment, noting “uncertainty” compounded by selective 
enforcement and 1978 statutory amendments based upon 
extensive study of inconsistent administration of statute).  
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Thus, Pennsylvania‟s argument that we should not apply 
Chevron here is unavailing. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
